Lynette Manske Torres v. John Martin Torres : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1992
Lynette Manske Torres v. John Martin Torres : Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David R. Hartwig; Attorney for Respondent.
Craig M. Peterson; Littlefield & Peterson; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Torres v. Torres, No. 920101.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/4040
)CUMENT 
' U 
.9 
i 
BRIEF 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNETTE MANSKE TORRES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JOHN MARTIN TORRES, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 920101-CA 
Civil No. 884902184 DA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 
Littlefield & Peterson 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID R. HARTWIG 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 486-1715 
Attorney for Respondent FILED 
AUG 3 11992 
COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNETTE MANSKE TORRES, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
JOHN MARTIN TORRES, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
APPELLANT ,S UK 1 Eh' 
Case No. 920101-CA 
Civil No. 884902184 DA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OK UTAH 
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 
Littlefield & Peterson 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
Attorney for Appellant 
DAVID R. HARTWIG 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Telephone: (801) 486-1715 
Attorney for Respondent 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
JURISDICTION 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
RELEVANT FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 11 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 12 
A. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding 
Defendant an Equitable Lien in the Residence 
Where the Residence Had a Negative Value . • . 12 
B. Requiring the Plaintiff to Pay for Two Rings 
Which Were Gifts to Her From Her Husband 
is Inequitable 14 
C. Requiring the Plaintiff to Pay One-half of the 
Medical Expenses When the Defendant Terminated 
the Insurance Policy on the Day of the 
Operation is Inequitable 16 
D. The Trial Court's Failure to Award Mrs. Torres 
Attorney's Fees is Inequitable 18 
CONCLUSION 19 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 1981) 3 
Beraer v. Beraer, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985) 16 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-135 (Utah 1987) 2, 13 
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222 (Utah 1980) 2 
Kerr v. Kerr. 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980) 3 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Utah 1980) 19 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988) . . . 3, 15 
Neumever v. Neumever, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987) . . . . 13 
Thompson v. Thompson. 709 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985) 2 
Turner v. Turner. 649 P.2d 6 (1982) 17 
Jackson v. Jackson. 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1 13, 14 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated. §78-2a-2(i) (1953 as amended) 2 
Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-5(i) 3, 13 
ii 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
LYNETTE MANSKE TORRES, : APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : 
v. : 
JOHN MARTIN TORRES, : 
Defendant/Respondent. z Case No. 920101-CA 
: Civil No. 884902184 DA 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-2(i) (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. The Court abused its discretion by awarding 
Defendant a lien against Plaintiff's residence where there is no 
equity in the residence and Defendant made no contribution to the 
mortgage payment while living there. Thompson v. Thompson, 709 
P.2d 360, 362 (Utah 1985); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 
1222 (Utah 1980); Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 1987). 
2. The Court abused its discretion in requiring the 
Plaintiff to make payments on gifts of two rings, which were given 
to her by the Defendant, and which were taken by the Defendant at 
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the time of the parties' separation in January, 1989, and are 
currently retained in his possession. Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 
P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1988). 
3. The Court abused its discretion by requiring the 
Plaintiff to participate in the payment of medical expenses for the 
surgery performed for a deviated septum and ventral hernia, when 
there would have been no charges beyond the deductible, had the 
Defendant not unilaterally canceled Plaintiff's health insurance 
the same day as the operation without giving anyone notice other 
than the health carrier. Berry v. Berry, 635 P.2d 68 (Utah 1981). 
4. The Court abused its discretion by failing to award 
the Plaintiff at least one-half of her attorney's fees which would 
not have been incurred but for the Defendant's acts in violation of 
reasonable rules of equity by taking the rings, which he had given 
to the Plaintiff as gifts and by cancelling the health insurance 
for the Plaintiff on the date of her surgery, August 15, 1990. 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1980). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5(1) in pertinent part states: 
When a Decree of Divorce is rendered, the Court 
may include in it equitable orders relating to 
the children, property and parties. 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant appeals from a Supplemental Decree of 
Divorce entered in the Third Judicial District Court, In and For 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on January 21, 1992. A Decree of 
Divorce was entered in this matter by the Court on February 4, 1991 
and all other matters were reserved for trial. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
1. A Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter on 
January 30, 1991, through a bifurcated proceeding reserving all 
remaining issues to be tried by the Court. 
2. The Supplemental Decree of Divorce was entered on 
January 21, 1992 (attached as Exhibit "A") and provided in 
pertinent part as follows: 
(1) At paragraph two, the Defendant was awarded an 
equity lien against the Plaintiff's residence 
in the amount of $4,000; 
(2) At paragraph four, the Decree directed that 
the Plaintiff shall be awarded two rings 
purchased by the Defendant from Morgan 
Jewelers and given to the Plaintiff as gifts 
on or about September 26, 1987. However, 
Plaintiff was ordered to reimburse the 
Defendant for any payments he made to Morgan 
4 
Jewelers for the rings since the parties' 
separation in mid-January, 1989. The 
Defendant was allowed to hold a possessory 
lien on the rings until the payments required 
by Plaintiff are fully satisfied and, further, 
directed the Defendant to restore the original 
stones to the rings and obtain certification 
from Morgan Jewelers that the rings are the 
same as they were when originally delivered to 
him in September, 1987. 
(3) At paragraph six, the Court ordered that each 
of the parties would pay one-half of the total 
medical bills incurred for surgery and 
treatment to the Plaintiff on or about August 
15, 1990 for a deviated septum and ventral 
hernia, even though the Defendant had 
terminated the medical insurance for the 
Plaintiff which would have paid for said 
surgery, and the termination of the insurance 
occurred on the date of surgery, August 15, 
1990. 
(4) At paragraph seven, the Court ordered that 
each of the parties would pay their own 
5 
labor was hired, and the Plaintiff and her two 
daughters were involved in the work. A 
reasonable value for all of the home 
improvements, at the time of completion, was 
$12,000. Even though the home had depreciated 
over the past several years, the improvements 
have added value to the property. It is 
reasonable for the Defendant to be awarded 
$4,000 as the reasonable value of his 
contributions to the improvements. 
(5) The Court found that the Defendant purchased 
two ladies' rings from Morgan Jewelers, one 
costing $1,575 and the other costing $2,538. 
The total charges incurred by the Defendant on 
his account at Morgan Jewelers was $4,327.03. 
Shortly before Christmas 1987, Defendant gave 
the rings to the Plaintiff as gifts. When the 
parties separated, the Defendant was still 
paying on the rings. The Court awarded the 
rings to the Plaintiff but allowed the 
Defendant to continue to hold a possessory 
lien on the rings until she paid the Defendant 
for all payments made since January, 1989, 
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when the parties separated. The Court further 
found that the Defendant had removed the 
original stones from the rings and found that 
the original stones should be restored to the 
rings and certified by Morgan Jewelers that 
they were in the same condition as when 
originally purchased. 
(6) Defendant caused Plaintiff's insurance 
coverage to be terminated effective August, 
1990, several months before the divorce was 
granted in this matter. There were no 
controlling Orders concerning health care 
coverage. The Court found at pre-trial on 
February 1, 1990, that the Plaintiff testified 
that the Defendant had mentioned to her that 
he had taken her off the insurance coverage, 
and that the Court had admonished Defendant to 
reinstate the coverage. The Court found no 
record other than the testimony of the 
Plaintiff, and found that no Order had been 
entered by the Court on the issue of 
insurance. 
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attorney's fees and costs they incurred in 
these proceedings. 
3. In support of the foregoing Order, the Court entered 
Findings of Facts (attached as Exhibit "B") as follows: 
(1) Plaintiff was living in her own home with her 
daughters from a previous marriage when a 
relationship commenced with the Defendant. 
She was a self-employed cosmetologist. 
(2) The parties did not file a joint tax return 
for the year 1986, the year of the marriage. 
Plaintiff sustained an operating loss of 
approximately $3,800 in her business for that 
year. Defendant started employment for C. R. 
England and Sons sometime around that time, 
but apparently did not have sufficient 
earnings to justify the filing of a joint tax 
return and the use of the net operating loss 
for tax purposes. 
(3) In 1987, Defendant brought in earnings of 
$26,500, while Plaintiff reported $787 income 
from her business. Defendant earned 
approximately $24,000 in 1988 while the 
Plaintiff earned approximately $4,200 from her 
6 
business. Joint returns were not filed in 
1989 and Plaintiff had a net income from her 
business for that year of approximately 
$8,800. 
(4) Plaintiff purchased her home...in 1982 for 
approximately $52,000. The Defendant claims 
an interest in that home. As of May 13, 1991, 
the value of the home was appraised at 
$37,000, even though the home has a current 
mortgage of approximately $47,000. During the 
marriage, the home was re-painted, re-
carpeted, the fireplace was removed and 
refinished, the basement was finished, 
including finishing of a bathroom, cedar was 
installed in the closet, a banister was 
installed down the stairway, the backyard was 
completed, and a cement patio was installed. 
Also, ceramic tile was installed in the entry 
way and kitchen. There were materials and 
outside labor costs of approximately $6,000, 
most of which came from joint marital funds. 
The greater part of the labor was performed by 
the Defendant, and a small portion of the 
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) The Court further found that on August 15, 
1990, surgical correction of a deviated septum 
and a ventral hernia took place for the 
Plaintiff, and the Utah Public Employee's 
Health Program declined payment for lack of 
coverage, because the Defendant had terminated 
health care coverage on the date of the 
surgery, August 15, 1990. The termination of 
the coverage was retroactive to August 1, 
1990. The total medical bills for the surgery 
were in the amount of $4,690, and Plaintiff 
asked recovery of this amount (less 
deductible) against the Defendant. The Court 
found that since there was no Order regarding 
health insurance coverage, it is reasonable 
that the obligations be treated as any other 
marital obligation and each pay one-half of 
the liability. 
) Each party was seeking attorney's fees, but 
the Court found that neither demonstrated a 
need for an award of fees. Further, each of 
the parties, in concert with their attorneys, 
contributed to the inability to settle. 
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Plaintiff, because of the nature of the 
disputed assets, wanted everything and the 
Defendant felt justified in wanting something. 
When the dropping of the health and medical 
coverage on Plaintiff occurred, that ended any 
possibility of settlement. Each party paid a 
high price in these proceedings, and on 
balance, each party should bear their own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court is required to enter equitable 
orders relating to the marital estate. The marital residence was 
pre-marital property which the Plaintiff purchased with her own 
funds and which had a negative value at the time of the Decree of 
Divorce; it was an abuse of discretion to award the Defendant an 
equitable lien in the marital residence. 
2. The Court failed to follow settled legal principals 
regarding gifts to spouses as being separate property when it 
awarded the Plaintiff two rings which were gifted to her by the 
Defendant in September, 1987, but required the Plaintiff to 
reimburse Defendant for all payments made on the rings after the 
parties separated in January, 1989. 
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3. The Court abused its discretion in requiring the 
Plaintiff to pay one-half of the medical expenses incurred for her 
operation on August 15, 1990 where the Defendant, who had 
historically maintained and paid the medical insurance for the 
parties, but canceled the insurance policy on the same day as the 
operation without prior notice to the Plaintiff. 
4. The Court abused its discretion in failing to award 
the Plaintiff at least one-half of her attorney's fees where the 
Defendant's outrageous actions precipitated the necessity of trial 
on the issues. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
A. The Court Abused Its Discretion in Awarding 
Defendant an Equitable Lien in the Plaintiff's Residence Where the 
Residence Had a Negative Value and was a Pre-marital Asset. The 
Court awarded the Defendant a $4,000.00 equitable lien in 
Plaintiff's home (Supplemental Decree, para. 2). The Plaintiff 
purchased the home in 1982 for $52,000.00; as of May 13, 1991, it 
had an appraisal value of $37,000.00. As of the date of trial, the 
then current mortgage was $47,000.00 (Findings of Fact, para. 7). 
The Defendant paid no rent or mortgage payments, but the trial 
court based its award on work which had been performed by the 
Defendant to improve the value of the home. All materials used in 
the maintenance were paid from joint marital funds. There is no 
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dispute that as of the date of trial, the residence had a negative 
value. 
The Court awarded the Defendant an equitable interest in 
property which had no equity, and in effect, further increased the 
debt on Plaintiff's home by $4,000.00. Where interpreting the 
equitable division statutes governing Divorce Decrees (§ 30-3-5(1), 
Utah Code Annotated), Utah courts consistently recognize that trial 
courts are conferred with broad discretion in dividing property 
between the parties to a divorce purely based upon equitable 
circumstances. Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 134-135 (Utah 1987). 
However, trial courts are required to make the ultimate division 
equitable. Equitable distribution of personal and real property 
requires that the property be fairly divided between the parties, 
given their contributions during the marriage and their 
circumstances at the time of divorce. Neumeyer v. Neumeyer, 745 
P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah 1987). 
It is patently inequitable to award the Defendant an 
equity interest in property with a negative value. In Jackson v. 
Jackson, 617 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980), the parties had a short term 
marriage during which time they incurred $60,000.00 in debt, which 
significantly exceeded all assets. The parties acquired a 
residence with a loan from the Plaintiff's father; the residence at 
the time of the divorce had $6,000.00 equity. The residence, along 
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with all other assets, were awarded to the Defendant and the 
Defendant was required to pay all liabilities. The Plaintiff 
appealed from the Divorce Decree requesting the Court to award her 
the $6,000.00 in equity in the home, as well as other property, 
free of liens and encumbrances. Upholding the trial court, the 
Court held that where the Defendant was required to pay all 
indebtedness on the property, which dramatically exceeded its 
value, it was fair and equitable that he should also receive the 
majority of the property. Contrary to the equitable principles 
applied in the Jackson case, the trial court is awarding Mr. Torres 
a lien in pre-marital property which has a negative value, where 
the debt is being totally paid by Mrs. Torres. Additionally, the 
trial court failed to take into account that Mr. Torres made no 
direct monetary contributions toward the home. Rather than 
awarding Mr. Torres a $4,000.00 equitable lien, as though the 
property increased in value, it would be more equitable to require 
Mr. Torres to pay Mr. Torres for the decline in value which 
occurred while the parties lived together. In essence, he lived in 
the home for free, paying no rent or mortgage payments? and is now 
being compensated for his only contribution. The net effect is the 
Plaintiff pays for Defendant's housing expenses. 
B. Requiring the Plaintiff to Pay for Two Rings Which 
Were Gifts to Her From Her Husband is Inequitable. The Court found 
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that the Defendant purchased two rings from Morgan Jewelers on 
September 26, 1987 for a total cost of $4,327.03 (Findings of Fact, 
para. 10). The Court further found that the Defendant made 
completed gifts to the Plaintiff shortly before Christmas 1987. 
When the parties separated in mid-January, 1989, the Defendant was 
still paying on the rings. The Court awarded the rings to the 
Plaintiff but required her to reimburse the Defendant for all 
payments made on the rings since January, 1989 (Supplemental 
Decree, para. 4). 
The general legal principals relating to gifts received 
during marriage is outlined in Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 
304, 308 (Utah 1988). In making an equitable division, trial 
courts should generally award property acquired by one spouse by 
gift and inheritance during the marriage to that spouse, together 
with any appreciating or enhancement of its values unless " 1) the 
other spouse has contributed to the enhancement, maintenance or 
protection of that property, thereby acquiring an equitable 
interest in it, or (2) the property has been consumed or its 
identity lost through commingling of exchanges or where the 
acquiring spouse had made a gift of an interest in the property to 
the other spouse." 
The case before the Court does not fall with any of the 
exceptions outlined in Mortensen. Mr. Torres made a completed gift 
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to Mrs. Torres with the intent that she become the owner of the 
rings and not that she be required to pay for the rings. Once the 
gift is completed, the obligation to pay for the gifts should 
remain with Mr. Torres. By requiring Mrs. Torres to essentially 
payoff the balance owing on the rings since January, 1989, the 
Court is taking the gift to Mrs. Torres and requiring her to pay 
for it. This is true even though Mr. Torres took the rings at 
separation, has kept them in his possession since then and has 
changed the stones to prevent Mrs. Torres from receiving the full 
value of the gift. 
Additionally, the Court's ruling is inconsistent with the 
legal principal that "the marital estate should be valued as of the 
time of the Divorce Decree." Berqer v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 
(Utah 1985). The Court related its Order back to the date of 
separation in January, 1989, rather than valuing the gift without 
debt as of the date of the Divorce Decree. This method of 
retroactive valuation of liabilities and assets of the parties is 
simply not warranted by the circumstances in this case. There is 
no equitable reason that the trial court should deviate from the 
general rule. 
The Court abused its discretion in requiring the 
Plaintiff to pay for the rings gifted to her by the Defendant. 
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C. Requiring the Plaintiff to Pay One-half of the 
Medical Expenses When the Defendant Terminated the Insurance Policy 
on the Day of the Operation is Inequitable. The Defendant had 
maintained medical insurance for the Plaintiff during the marriage. 
During the course of the litigation, there were no Orders entered 
regarding maintenance of insurance. However, the Plaintiff 
testified that the Defendant mentioned that he had taken the 
Plaintiff off the insurance coverage, and the Court admonished the 
Defendant to reinstate the coverage (Findings of Fact, 12). In 
July, 1990, Plaintiff consulted with a physician who obtained pre-
approval from the Utah Public Employee's Health Program. In 
reliance of the historical fact of the Defendant maintaining the 
Plaintiff on his health policy, the Plaintiff had an operation on 
August 15, 1990. On the same date, the Defendant terminated his 
coverage of the Plaintiff, which was retroactive to August 1, 1990. 
Rather than dealing with the inequity created by the Defendant's 
actions, the Court treated the medical bills as any other marital 
debt and required the Plaintiff and Defendant to each pay one-half 
of the medical bills incurred for the operation. (Supplemental 
Decree, para. 6). 
The gross injustice created by the Court's Order is 
evident. The Court through the concept of fairness and equity out 
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the window by its Order. As stated in Turner v. Turner, 649 P.2d 
6 (1982): 
Although this Court may weigh the evidence and 
substitute its judgments for that of the trial 
court in divorce actions, this Court will not do 
so lightly and merely because its judgment may 
differ from that of the trial judge. A trial 
court's apportionment of property will not be 
disturbed unless it works such a manifest 
injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear 
abuse of discretion, id at 8. 
Without notice, and with apparent malice, the Defendant's 
action unquestionably were directed at financially harming the 
Plaintiff. Mrs. Torres acted innocently and in reliance upon her 
husband having maintained the health insurance policy. The Court 
requiring Mrs. Torres to pay one-half of the medical bills, which 
would have been paid by insurance but for Defendant's 
maliciousness, is clearly unjust. 
D. The Trial Court's Failure to Award Mrs. Torres' 
Attorney's Fees is Inequitable. The Court found that the Defendant 
made completed gifts to the Defendant of the two rings shortly 
before Christmas in 1987 (Findings of Fact, 10). However, the 
Defendant had taken the rings from the Plaintiff and would not 
return them. The Court further found that the Defendant terminated 
Plaintiff's coverage under his health plan on August 15, 1990, the 
day of the Plaintiff's operation (Findings of Fact, 12). The Court 
further found that the Defendant terminating the health and medical 
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coverage on Plaintiff ended any possibility of settlement and "each 
party has paid a high price." The Court also found that each 
party, because of the disputed nature of the assets, contributed to 
the inability to settle the case, and each party had approximately 
the same monthly income and, therefore, did not demonstrate a need 
for fees. However, it is apparent from the actions of the 
Defendant that the ruthless manner in which he has treated the 
Plaintiff during this litigation has propelled the matter to trial. 
Equity demands recognition of these factors which have prolonged 
litigation requiring the Plaintiff to incur significantly greater 
attorney's fees than otherwise would have been necessary had the 
Defendant acted reasonably. 
Traditionally, Utah courts have required a showing that 
a party seeking alimony show need and a basis for the 
reasonableness of the award. Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1384-85 
(Utah 1980). A factor which should be considered by the Court, 
however, when dealing with the basis of awarding attorney's fees, 
is that party which is responsible for prolonging the litigation. 
As stated by the Plaintiff, she anticipated paying her attorney's 
fees and would have settled on almost all issues until the point 
when Mr. Torres took her off of his insurance and refused to pay 
for the medical bills. (Transcript pp. 91-92 attached as Exhibit 
"C"). When the mean-spirited actions of one party to a litigation 
19 
promote continued attorney's fees, it is fair and equitable that 
the parties so behaving be charged with the fees. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the Plaintiff's position that equity require that 
the Court's Order granting the Defendant an equitable lien of 
$4,000.00 in Plaintiff's home be set aside based upon the abuse of 
discretion by the trial court. The Court Order requiring the 
Plaintiff to pay for the rings after separation in January, 1989, 
which were given to her by the Defendant should be set aside in 
that the Order fails to follow settled principals of law relating 
to gifts. The Court's Order requiring the Defendant to pay one-
half of her medical expenses is unreasonable and inequitable and 
should be set aside as an abuse of discretion, requiring the 
Defendant to pay all of the medical expenses, except the 
deductible. The Court's failure to award at least one-half of 
Plaintiff's attorney's fees should be set aside as an abuse of 
discretion, and the Defendant should be required to pay one-half 
thereof. 
DATED this 't>/ day of August, 1992. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
CRAIG #T. PETERSON 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, APPELLANT'S BRIEF, this 
7;/£? day of August, 1992, to: 
David R. Hartwig, Esq. 
263 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Respondent 
Torres.AB/P8 —v 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
22 
J / 
Craig M. Peterson (2579) 
At torney for P l a i n t i f f 
LITTLZJIZLD i PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
S a l t Lake Ci tv f Utah 84102 
Telephone: (8011 521-0435 
III THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
::: AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATZ OF UTAE 
LYNNETTE MANSKZ TORRES, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
JOHN MARTIN TORRES, 
Defendant. 
SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 894902184 
Jucce 
— o o O o o — — — — 
The above matter came before the Court for trial on July 
31, 1991 and concluded on August 6f 1991. The Plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by counsel, Craig M. Peterson. 
The Defendant was present in person and represented by counsel, 
David R. Zartvig. The Court having heretofore entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Lawf does now enter its Supplemental 
Decree of Divorce as follows: 
1 
SUPPLEME!7TAL DECRES OF DIVORCE 
1. The Decree of Divorce heretofore entered in this 
matter en February 4, 1991
 f is supplemented for the division of 
property by this Order. 
2. The Defendant shall be awarded an equity lien 
against the Plaintiff's residence in the amount of $4, COO. 
2. The Plaintiff shall be awarded ail right, title and 
interest in ate to the proceeds from the sale of the 1S73 Reineil 
boat, and eacn cf the parties shall be denied any additional claims 
they have mace for recovery en losses and repairs made to said 
boat. 
4 • The Plaintiff shall be awarded both rings purchased 
by the Defendant from Morgan Jewelers on or about September 26, 
1987. However, Plaintiff is ordered to reimburse the Defendant for 
any payments he has made to Morgan Jewelers for the rings since the 
parties' separation in mid-January, 1989. The Defendant shall hold 
a possessory lien on the rings until the payments provided herein 
are fully satisfied. The Defendant shall restore the original 
stones to the rings and obtain certification from Morgan Jewelers 
that the rings are the same as they were when they were originally 
delivered to him in September, 1987. 
2 
5. The Defendant shall be ordered to pay the uncovered 
portion cf treatment for the Plaintiff's jaw in the amount of 
$65.75. 
6. Each of the parties shall pay one-half of the total 
medical bills incurred for surgery and treatment to the Plaintiff 
on or about August 15
 f 1990 for a deviated septum and a ventral 
hernia. Further, each cf the parties snail be ordered to pay one-
half of any fees cr costs taxed against the parties through any 
collection or legal actions, and the Defendant shall be ordered to 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
7. Each of the parties shall be ordered to pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs which they have incurred in these 
proceedings. 
DATED this Zl^dav cf January, 1992. 
BY TEE' COURT: 
D i s t r i c t Court JXicge" 
Approved as t o form: 
DAVID R. EARTWIG, Esq. 
A t t o r n e y for defendant 
TarxM.SDC/ru 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
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CRAIG M. PETERSON - 2579 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
LYNNETTE MANSKE TORRES, 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, : CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : 
JOHN MARTIN TORRES, : 
Defendant. : Case No. 894902184 DA 
: Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
ooOoo 
The above matter came before the Court on Wednesday, the 
16th day of January, 1991, at the hour of 8:30 a.m., the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge presiding for hearing. The Plaintiff was 
present in person and represented by Counsel, Craig M. Peterson. 
The Defendant was present in person and represented by Counsel, 
David R. Hartwig. The Defendant having agreed, by and through 
Counsel, that the Plaintiff may receive a Decree of Divorce through 
bifurcation of these proceedings reserving all remaining issues for 
trial before the Court, the Court having concluded that the matter 
should be bifurcated, and the default of the Defendant entered as 
1 
to the issue of the granting of the divorce, the Court having 
entered the default of the Defendant for that purpose, having 
received the testimony of the Plaintiff and having reviewed the 
pleadings on file herein, does now enter its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties herein were bona fide residents of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three months immediately 
proceeding the filing of this action. 
2. The parties are husband and wife, having been 
married in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on July 19, 1986. 
During the term of the marriage the parties commenced to argue 
continuously, the Defendant committed assault and battery upon the 
person of the Plaintiff causing her physical injury, the parties 
have lived separate and apart for in excess of two years, the 
Plaintiff is no longer in love with the Defendant and cannot 
continue to remain married to him. 
3. The Plaintiff is in need of health insurance and 
such insurance should be available to her through Cobra 
legislation. Each of the parties should be required to undertake 
the completion of any documents necessary to provide such health 
insurance for the benefit of the Plaintiff. 
4. All remaining issues should be reserved to be 
2 
determined at the time of trial in this matter. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, this Court 
does enter its just and equitable Conclusions of Law as follows: 
1. This Court does have jurisdiction to enter a Decree 
of Divorce in this matter. 
2. The Plaintiff should be awarded a Decree of Divorce 
against the Defendant upon the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
3. Each of the parties should be ordered to undertake 
whatever actions are necessary for the Plaintiff to obtain health 
and accident insurance through the Defendant's employer pursuant to 
the requirements of Cobra. 
4. All remaining issues should be reserved for final 
determination at trial in this matter. 
5. This matter is set to be tried to the Court on those 
issues on May 17, 1991, at the hour of 8:30 a.m. 
DATED this day of , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
Kenneth Rigtrup 
District Court Judge 
3 
Torres v. Torres 
Re: Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law 
Approval as to form: 
David R. Harrwig 
11004.pld/capl 
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canceled? 
A. Yes, 
3| Q» In addition, the primary i3sue has been 
4 tne house and his interest in the house? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q» Is the -- are you willing* again* to 
7 give hia that house? 
8 A. Definitely. 
9 CU Has the i3sue oeen any interest that he 
10 raignt have in having paid for that boat? 
11 A. Pardon ae? 
12 Q. Has an issue also been any interest that 
13 he aignt have had in paying for that boat? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 THE COURT: I'm not sure that I 
16 understand that. 
17 MR. PETERSON: That's okay. It's not a 
18 very good question, anyway. 
19 As a result of tnose positions on the 
20 part of Mr. Torres* is it your position that youfre in 
21 court unnecessarily today? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 MR. PETERSON: Thank you. 
** THE COURT: You may cross. 
25 
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1 0# Are you now, nowever, asking the Court 
2 to award you attorney fees in this matter? 
3 A. Yes, I am* 
4 Q« Do you have a specific amount in mind 
5 that you are asking the Court to award? 
61 A* I would like hiia to pay half of tnen, at 
7 least; or more than that* 
81 Q. Half of the total foes that have been 
9 incurred? 
10 A. ?es. 
11 0. And it is your expectation that the fee3 
12 will generally exceed 55,500, in total, is that 
13 correct? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Is it your desire that the Court order 
16 Mr. Torres to pay not less than $2,500, and 
17 preferably, $3,000 toward your fees? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Qt Why is it that you ask the Court for 
20 that award in fees? 
21 A. Because I didn't ask to be here over 
22 this surgery. I mean, it could have been a simple 
23 thing had we just settled out of court. 
24 Q # And, in fact, were you at a stage that 
25 was verging on settlement until the insurance was 
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